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MOPPETS ON THE MARKET: THE PROBLEM OF
UNREGULATED ADOPTIONS
THE market for babies is a sellers' market. As a result, a few individuals
make money by selling babies as they would sell goods. Contrary to popular
impression, however, "black market" placements-independent 1 adoptive
placements in which a third party makes a profit-are not common. By
far the greater number of adoptions are the product of independent place-
ments arranged without profit by well-meaning parents, friends, relatives,
doctors, and lawyers.2 Only in about one-fourth of the cases are placements
1. An "independent" placement is one made without the aid of an authorized child-
welfare agency. Authorized agencies include state welfare departments and private
agencies which they license and supervise. The welfare department usually has authority to
license private agencies to engage in child-placing work. See, e.g., ficir. Azm,. STAT.
§ 25.358(3) (Henderson, Supp. 1949); S.D. Laws 1939, c. 168, § 3. Only a few states,
however, require that all adoptive placements be made through these authorized agencies.
See pages 731-4 infra.
2. This conciusion is based upon information received in response to a questionnaire
sent to the welfare departments of the various states. Replies were received from thirty-
five states and the District of Columbia. As to the extent of "black market" trading in
babies, the following statements are typical. "[W]e do not believe there is much of this
activity in Texams.... What we have seen referred to as the 'grey market' is much more
prevalent in this State. It involves placements by physicians, lawyers, ministers, midwives,
who are often well-meaning, but who cannot, of course, offer the protection of agency
services." Communication to the Y. LAW JotmNAL from Mr. John I. Winters, Fx-
ecutive Director, Texas Department of Public Welfare, dated January 3, 1950, in Yale
Law Library.
"For the most part, intermediaries in independent placements are physicians, nurses,
lawyers and friends of the mother or friends of the petitioners who participate sometimes
directly and other times indirectly in the placements. It is our belief that for the most
part these intermediaries are persons who have known of the petitioners' desire for a
child, or know of the mother's interest in relinquishing or releasing a child for adoption,
but we do not consider that they are actively engaged in child placing from a commercial
standpoint." Communication to the YALE LA w JoURNAL from Miss Loa Howard, Ad-
ministrator, Oregon Public Welfare Commission, dated January 18, 1950, in Yale Law
Library.
It appears that the bulk of independent placements are made by parents and physicians.
An analysis of 2,587 independent adoptions which were approved by the California welfare
department in 1948, for e:ample, revealed that 43.8 percent of the placements had been
made by parents and 25.6 percent had been made by physicians. Communication to the
Y=sE LAw JOURNAL from Miss Myrtle Williams, Director, California Department of
Social Welfare dated November 30, 1949, in Yale Law Library.
Although "black market" placements are not frequent, it is a common practice in
independent placements for adoptive parents to pay the doctor's fee and the hospital
expenses of the natural mother. A study of 992 children placed independently with
non-relatives in Florida in 1947-S disclosed that in at least 45 percent of the cases
both the doctor's fee and the hospital costs had been paid by the adoptive parents. WMIX,
ANALYsis OF ADnoxrsoxs N FLoumA 1943-49, p. 10 (mimeographed, 1949). The situation
in other states is similar. Louisiana, for example, reports that "there are a very large
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made by authorized child-welfare agencies, which are best equipped to
protect the interests of all by seeing that the right child gets in the right
home.3
When adoptions are the product of independent placements, the blind
frequently lead the blind. Good intentions are no substitute for trained and
experienced personnel. The interests of the child, as well as those of the
natural and adoptive parents, may be lost and unprotected in a humanitarian
mist. The problem is becoming acute, for adoption is increasing by leaps
and bounds. Adoption petitions were filed for approximately 50,000 children
in 1944, a three-fold increase over 1934.4 And recent figures indicate another
40 to 50 percent increase in the last five years.5
Most of these children are adopted at an age when they are far too young
to look after their own interests. A recent Children's Bureau survey indi-
cated that at the time of the filing of the adoption petition, 62 percent were
under six, 26 percent were between six and fourteen, and 12 percent were
between fourteen and twenty-one.6 This extreme youth also makes it
number of cases which although not strictly 'black market' involve the payment of support
to the girl during the period of her pregnancy or confinement as well as various presents
under the guise of providing the girl with an adequate wardrobe, helping her find a job,
giving her rail fare back to her home town, etc." Communication to the YAMLL LAW
JOURNAL from Mr. Lawrence E. Higgins, Commissioner, Louisiana Department of Public
Welfare, dated November 9, 1949, in Yale Law Library.
3. A Children's Bureau (Federal Security Agency) study of 9,000 children for whom
adoption petitions had been filed in fifteen states in 1944 disclosed that slightly more than
a quarter had been placed in the adoptive home by an authorized agency; another quarter
had been placed independently with unrelated persons; and approximately a half were
being adopted, without the aid of an agency, by stepparents and other relatives. Zarefsky,
Children Acquire New Parents, 10 CHU.D 142, 143 (1946). The proportion of adoptive
placements made by authorized agencies varies substantially from state to state, however.
Thus Maine reports that of the total number of adoptions made in that state in 1948, only
9 percent involved placements by authorized agencies, whereas in Louisiana authorized
agencies handled 48 percent. Communications to the YALE LAW JoURNAL from Miss
Lena Parrott, Director of Child Welfare, Maine Department of Health and Welfare,
dated November 14, 1949, and from Mr. Lawrence E. Higgins, Commissioner, Louisiana
Department of Public Welfare, dated November 9, 1949, both in Yale Law Library.
4. In 1944 twenty-two states reported a total of more than 16,000 children for whom
adoption petitions had been filed. On the basis of this figure the Children's Bureau
estimated that in that year petitions had been filed for approximately 50,000 children
throughout the country. Zarefsky, supra note 3, at 142. In the six states for which compa-
rable statistics were available, the number of children for whom petitions were filed in
1944 was more than three times as great as in 1934. Ibid.
5. The Children's Bureau is at present collecting data on the number of petitions filed
in 1948. Preliminary examination of some of the reports where comparable data are
available for 1944 indicates that adoption petitions have increased between 40 and 50
percent since that time. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Miss I. Evelyn
Smith, Consultant on Foster Care, Social Service Division, Children's Bureau, dated
November 22, 1949, in Yale Law Library.
6. Zarefsky, supra note 3, at 143. This information was available for 8,764 of the
9,000 children for whom adoption petitions were filed in fifteen states in 1944. Almost
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inordinately difficult for potential adoptive parents or any untrained layman
to make an intelligent decision, to foresee future problems latent at the time
of adoption.
In an effort to protect all parties, most states have passed laws providing
for an increased administrative and judicial supervision over adoption gen-
erally. These laws vary considerably in effectiveness and in strictness of
enforcement, but the best reflect the procedure of authorized adoption
agencies. Their procedure, while not wholly standardized, eliminates much
of the hazardous guesswork inherent in casual independent placements, and
substitutes an informed professional judgment which may offer the best
hope for family happiness.
THE PRACTICE OF AuTHORIZED ADOPTION AGENCIES
Authorized adoption agencies are of three general types: state welfare
departments, private agencies engaged solely in adoption work, and private
agencies whose adoption activities are only one part of a general child-
welfare program. In many states the welfare department's adoption service
merely supplements private facilities,7 but in one state that department is
the sole agency making adoptive placements." A few private agencies in
large cities are adoption agencies exclusively, providing care only for children
made available for adoption.9 But the great majority of private agencies
placing children for adoption are general child-welfare agencies, whose
purpose is to provide all types of care for dependent, neglected, or delinquent
children.
Many of the children under the supervision of a general welfare agency
are not available for adoption. Some are away from their families only
temporarily. 0 Other children, though likely to remain under the agency's
care for a longer period, are unavailable for adoption because their parents
half of the children were being adopted by stepparents and other relatives, and such chil-
dren usually are older than others being adopted. Therefore the proportion of young
children being adopted by non-relatives was even greater than the figures indicate. Ibid.
7. E.g., Maine, Nebraska, Washington. In a few states placements are also made
by county adoption agencies. California, for emample, amended its adoption law in 1947
to authorize the licensing of county adoption agencies by the state welfare department.
CAL. CivIr CODE § 225m (Deering, 1949). The county adoption agencies are reimbursed
by the state for their entire administrative costs and for a portion of the costs of caring
for children relinquished to them. Communication to the Yu LAW.i JourNaL from Miss
Myrtle Williams, Director, California Department of Social Welfare, dated November
30, 1949, in Yale Law Library.
-S. Arkansas. Communication -to the YAia LAw JounMA. from Mrs. Henry Bethell,
-Commissioner, Arkansas Department of Public Welfare, dated December 27, 1949, in
Yale Law Library.
9. Wilson, What the Layman Does Not Know About Adoption, 26 CHILD NVEWanr
LEAGuE OF AmuaCA BuLLI. x 13, 14 (June 1947).
10. In a typical instance the child's mother is being divorced and remarried, after
-which the child will'return to her. See LocmuGoa ADoPTrNG A CHILD 28 (pamphlet ed.,
1948).
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have neither abandoned them nor consented to their adoption." Some
children are not adoptable because of serious mental and physical defects.
For all these children who cannot be placed in adoptive homes, the agency
must provide some alternative form of care, either in private families or in
an institution. Many of them are placed in boarding homes, private homes
in which the agency pays the cost of the child's basic maintenance.
The children who are available for adoption come under the supervision
of an authorized agency in a variety of ways. Some are orphans and found-
lings. Others have been removed from their homes and placed under agency
guardianship by a court order because they were neglected or mistreated by
their parents. But a far greater number of children are voluntarily surren-
dered to the agency, most often by unwed mothers. Illegitimate children
account for about 60 percent of all children adopted,12 and if adoptions by
stepparents and other relatives are excluded, this figure runs even higher.
Thus, one of the adoption agency's main responsibilities is to provide prompt,
sympathetic, and skillful service for the unmarried mother." If she is un-
decided about surrendering her child for adoption, the agency explores with
her the alternatives, including temporary placement in a boarding home.
Often a mother who has surrendered a child immediately after its birth
later finds that she is in a position to care for the child. A reputable agency
accepts a surrender only after the mother herself has decided that adoption
is the best plan. But once a child is deemed available for adoption, four
procedures are carried out: an investigation of the natural parents, a study
of the child, an evaluation of the prospective adoptive parents, and a super-
vised probationary period.
Investigation of the Natural Parents
If a child's parents are known-that is, if he is not a foundling-the agency
seeks information about his family background. An unmarried mother is
asked to disclose confidentially to the agency the name of the child's father,
so that the agency can investigate both the maternal and paternal histories.
Some agencies regard a child as unsuitable for adoption if his family history
discloses pathological conditions which some medical opinion views as
hereditary. 14 But most agencies feel that little is known about what con-
11. Stougaard, Unsound Talk About Adoption, 27 Crnuw WErLFAi 17 (November,
1948).
12. The Children's Bureau study of 9,000 children for whom adoption petitions were
filed in fifteen states in 1944 revealed that 58 percent of the children were illegitimate.
Zarefsky, supra note 3, at 144. An earlier Bureau study of 2,041 adoption petitions filed
in nine states in 1934 disclosed that 61 percent were for illegitimate children. Cozaw, PRon-
LEMS AND PROCEDURES iN ADOPT oN 10 (Children's Bureau Publication No. 262, 1941).
13. See Social Workers Look at Adoption, 10 CHILD 110 (1946) for an appraisal of
agency shortcomings in this respect.
14. See Lippman, Suitability of the Child for Adoption, 7 AmEmcAm JOURNAL OF
ORTHOPSYcHiATRY 270 (1937); TEAGAnEN, CHILD PsYcnoLo FoR PRoMssoI(AI
WORKERS 30-68 (1940).
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ditions are inheritable, and that no child should be excluded from adoption
solely on the basis of his assumed hereditary background. 5 A child whose
family history is spotted with feeblemindedness, epilepsy, or psychoses,
needs special scrutiny, but his family background is only one of many
elements to be taken into account before a final decision is made as to
whether he is adoptable.'
Study of the Child
Most agencies place the child in a pre-adoption boarding home for at
least three months as soon as he comes under their care. 7 During this
period the agency tries to get as complete a picture of the child as possible-
physically, mentally, and psychologically. 8 The first step is a thorough
medical examination. 9 A child may still be adoptable though suffering
from congenital abnormalities, such as blindness or deafness, or from a
disease like syphilis, tuberculosis, or diabetes. But the agency must know
these medical facts in order to provide immediate treatment. Eventually
it may pass the child on to adoptive parents who, fully informed of the
child's condition, still wish to adopt him and have the means to provide him
with proper medical care.
It is equally important that the agency have an estimate of the child's
intelligence, maturity level, and rate of development. For children two
years of age and older the Stanford-Binet intelligence test is most commonly
used. But many of the children adopted are younger than two, and for them
no Stanford-Binet test is available.2- Increasing use is being made of the
15. See Clothier, Placing the Child for Adoption, 26 MFNTAL HYGIENE 257, 259-61
(1942); Theis, Case Work in the Process of Adoption in 69 Pnoc=R IGs or Tim NA-
riorAr. CoiR cE: or SocIAL Woax 405, 409 (1942); Wolkomir, The Unadoptablc Baby
Achieves Adoption, 26 CunD WELrAR LEAGUE OF AumcA BULEN 1 (Feb. 1947).
16. Various studies have explored the relative influence of heredity and environment
upon the mental development of adopted children. See, e.g., Freeman, Holzinger, &
Mitchell, The Influence of Environment on the Intelligence, School Achievement, and
Conduct of Foster Children, 27 NATIoNAL Socmry FOR TIM STUDY OF EnucATotu YzAR-
Boor, 103 (1928); Burks, The Relative Influence of Nature and Nurture upon Mental
Development, 27 id. at 219; Leahy, Nature-Nurture and Intelligence in 17 Gnu-rzc
PsYcHoLorY MONOGRAPHS 235 (1937) ; SxODAK, CnnmnE ix FosR Ho=as: A SrTUY
OF MENTAL DEvEOPMEN.T (1939). The results of these and other studies are summarized
in BaooKs & BRooEs, ADvzNTUR IG ix ADOPTON 172-9 (1939), and TEAGAIWEN, Op. cit.
supra note 14, at 41-53.
17. Clothier, Adoption Procedure and the Community, 25 MENAL HyGIEm 196, 206
(1941). Some agencies have experimented with the practice of transferring the child from
his present home to his permanent adoptive home without the use of an interim temporary
placement. Oshlag, Direct Placement in Adoption, 27 JoURNAL oF SocIAL CAszwonn 229
(1946).
18. Pendleton, Agency Responsibility in Adoption, 19 FAurxy 35, 37-8 (1938).
19. See Clothier, Some Aspects of the Problem of Adoption, 9 Ars mancm JoUnsAL
OF ORTrOPsycHIATRY 598, 605 (1939).
20. See TERmAN & MERRILL, MEASURING INTELLIGENCE (1937).
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diagnostic tests developed by Gesell and others at the Yale Child Develop-
ment Clinic for children ranging from four weeks to three years. The Gesell
system sets up test situations for each of the four major fields of behavior-
motor, adaptive, language, and personal-social. 21 A particular child's
patterns of behavior in each of these fields is observed and then compared
with norms appropriate to his age. 22 Thus the Gesell system, unlike the
Stanford-Binet, is not limited to a single inclusive formula. But regardless
of which system is used, the tests are the beginning and not the end of
diagnosis. The child's rate of development may change when he is placed
in a more favorable environment.23 In the last analysis the diagnostician
must weigh all the qualifying considerations, including medical history,
previous environment, and the performance of the child.
If on the basis of the physical and mental tests a child is found to be un-
adoptable, he either remains in the agency, is placed in a boarding home, or,
if he is definitely feeble-minded, he may be committed to a state institution.
A child whose adoptability is uncertain remains under agency care for
further testing and observation until a final decision can be made. However,
after a child is adjudged adoptable, the sooner he is placed the better.
Children adopted at an early age have a far greater chance of normal adjust-
ment.2
4
Evaluation of the Adoptive Parents
Many agencies have ten times as many applicants as they have children
available for adoption .2  The agency must first determine, on the basis of
interviews and a home study, which of the applicants are fit to be adoptive
parents." Then, from its list of suitable adoptive parents on the one hand
and its list of available children on the other, the agency must "match"
parents and child.
In the interviews the caseworker explores with the applicants their
motives for adoption. The experience of agencies has shown that certain
motives on the part of adoptive parents lead to an impossible situation for
21. GESELL & AMATRUDA, DEVELOPMENTAL DIAGNOsIs 7 (2d ed. 1947).
22. Id. at 111: A separate rating is determined for each of the four fields of behavior.
Only when the child's maturity in all fields is at nearly the same level is it deemed per-
missible to assign an overall maturity level and a general rating. Id. at 114.
23. Jenkins, Adoption Practices and the Physician, 103 AmERICAN MEDICAL Assom-
TION JOURNAL 403, 405 (1934); Clothier, Placing the Child for Adoption, 26 MENTAL
HYGIENE 257, 262 (1942). And see articles cited in note 16 supra.
24. See THEIs, How FOSTER CHILrEN TURN OUT 113-118, 163 (1924).
25. Michaels, Casework Considerations it Rejecting the Adoption Application, 28
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL CASEWORK 370 (1947). This figure is corroborated by reports re-
ceived from various states in response to a questionnaire. See note 2 supra.
26. See, generally, Harral, The Foster Parent and the Agency in, the Adoplion
Process in 68 PROCEEDINGS OF TiE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WPx 411 (1941);
Brenner, The Selection of Adoptive Parents: A Casework Responsibility, 25 CnUUM WEL-
FARE LEAGUE OF AmERICA Buuranx 1 (Dec. 1946).
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the child: the husband or wife thinks that adopting a child is the solution
to an unhappy marriage; a couple wants an adopted child merely as a play-
mate for a child of their own; the family doctor has recommended adoption
as a cure for the wife's nervousness.? The caseworker looks for applicants
who regard an adopted child as something more than a satisfaction of their
own needs, who recognize him as a separate personality with needs of his
OWn. 
2
The adoptive parents must have not only the will but the power to give
the child a fit home.2 This means a state of reasonable health and a life
expectancy sufficient to cover the child's growing years. Mental deficiency,
drug addiction, epilepsy, alcoholism, or any chronic and incapacitating dis-
ease disqualifies an adoptive applicant. Prospective parents must also be
capable of providing the child with the necessities of life and with a min-
imum of educational advantages. Once this basic financial requirement is
met, high-income applicants are not necessarily favored over low-income
ones.30
I If the applicant couple is childless, it is important to know whether they
are likely to have a child of their own. The subsequent birth of a natural
child often places an adopted child in a disadvantageous position, because
the need for which a child was adopted has been filled.31 Hence many
agencies request childless couples to be examined by a gynecologist, and if
there is a reasonable possibility of a natural child, their application may be
rejected.
3 2
Some agencies make a preliminary sifting of applicants on the basis of
certain fixed standards. One of the leading agencies in New York City, for
example, automatically rules out all women over thirty-five, all men over
forty, and all persons who have children of their own.33 Some agencies re-
fuse to consider single persons or couples with two or more adopted chil-
27. Clothier, Some Aspects of the Problcm of Adoption, 9 A=Elcsu JoUMINAL oF
ORTEopsYcaiATRY 598, 610 (1939) ; Clothier, Placing the Child for Adoption, 26 ME-rAL
HYGmNE 257, 265-6 (1942); Gillean, The Responsibility of Private Child Wellare
Agencies for Adoptions, 17 Crnm ,Varunmn LEAGUE OF AaMMcA Buunui; 1 (June 193S).
28. Jenkins, supra note 23, at 404.
29. Id. at 404-5.
30. For example, two-thirds of the children placed by the Free Synagogue Child
Adoption Committee, one of the leading adoption agencies in New York City, are placed
in families with annual incomes of less than $6,000. FRm SYAGmuE CnmD AroPTnoN
Com-nTY'E HVER A FE= HAS A FiuND. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1950, p. 37,
col. 5.
31. Clothier, Placing the Child for Adoption, 26 MEx.A. HYGmXn 257, 267-8 (1942);
Jenkdns, supra note 23, at 405; Rathbun, The Adoptive Foster Parent, 23 CnaD VEL A
LEAGUE oF AmmicA BuLLETrI 5, 6-7 (Nov. 1944).
32. McCormik, The Adopting Parent Sees the Child in S=uDiEs oF CHru.nmi 133,
134 (Meyer ed. 1948).
33. Communication to the YALE LAw JourmNA. from Miss Roberta Andrews, Assistant
Director, Spence-Chapin Adoption Service, New York City, dated March 6, 1950, in
Yale Law Library.
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dren. 34 Most agencies, however, follow what seems to be the more desirable
practice of judging each case on its own merits. An unmarried, divorced,
or widowed person deserves consideration, even though a family environ-
ment is usually more promising. A couple in their forties may on occasion
offer the best home for a particular child, despite the fact that preference
might normally be given to younger couples.
If an application is accepted, it is followed by a home study. In evaluating
a home the caseworker attempts to get a careful diagnostic picture of the
applicants as prospective parents. She makes several visits to the home,
and also talks with relatives and friends of the family. Her investigation
attempts to bring to light any serious personality defects or any evidences
of marital incompatibility that might threaten the child's security 5 The
agency wants couples who are mature and emotionally well adjusted.
Once a home has been approved generally, the "matching" process begins:
the agency must decide which children and which parents are best suited to
one another. Physical, mental, psychological, and religious factors are taken
into consideration. An effort is made to see that the child's features and
general appearance do not differ too much from those of his adoptive par-
ents. An agency usually selects adoptive parents of the same race and re-
ligious faith as that of the child. Some state statutes make this mandatory,
others are merely suggestive." Insofar as possible, a child of superior in-
34. Michaels, supra note 25, at 370.
35. Clothier, Placing the Child for Adoption, 26 MENTAL HYGIENE 257, 266 (1942).
36. Texas specifically prohibits the adoption of white children by Negroes and of
Negro children by whites. TEx. ANN. CIV. STAT. art. 46a, § 8 (Vernon, 1947). Montana
and Louisiana require that the petitioner and the child be of the same race. MoNT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 61-127 (Choate & Wertz, 1947); LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4827, 4839.26
(Dart, 1939). The Nevada adoption statute is inapplicable to any "Mongolian" except
in the cases of an adult "Mongolian" seeking to adopt a "Mongolian" child. Nv. Coup.
LAws § 9484 (Hillyer, 1929). Indiana, Washington, and the District of Columbia, al-
though not prohibiting interracial adoptions, require that the petition include facts as to
race. IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-116 (Burns, 1946) ("color" of child); WAsUI. RE. STAT.
ANN. § 1699-7 (Remington, Supp. 1943) (race of petitioner and child); D.C. CoDE
§ 16-201 (1940) (race of petitioner and natural parents).
Religious restrictions take a variety of forms. Several states require that a court, when
practicable, select adoptive parents of the same religious faith as that of the child or his
natural parents. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 4, § 4-2 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1949) ("whenever
possible"); N.Y. SOCIAL WLFwARE LAW § 373 ("when practicable"); R.I. Laws 1946,
c. 1772 (absolute requirement "if there is a proper or suitable person of the same religious
faith or persuasion as that of the child available to whom orders of adoption may be
granted"; otherwise "when practicable"). A few states require that information regard-
ing the religion of the prospective adoptive parents and of the child be set forth in the
petition. E.g., IowA CODE § 600.1 (1946); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 85F (Flack, Supp.
1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1 (Purdon, Supp. 1948). Some states require that reports
submitted to the court by the state welfare department or other agencies include informa-
tion as to race and religion. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6867 (1949) (religion); GA. CODE
ANN. § 74-411 (Supp. 1947) (race and religion).
These statutory restrictions, especially those forbidding interracial adoptions, raise a
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telligence is placed in a home with intellectual interests and educational
advantages. But this is never the main consideration; a child with a high
I.Q. may be placed with persons of only average intelligence if the case-
worker believes that the child will be well adjusted in his new home and
that the applicants will make good adoptive parents.
Probationary Period
Most agencies require a probationary period of a year in the adoptive
home before the adoption is legally consummated. The purpose is twofold:
to help adoptive parents integrate the child into their family life, and to
make certain that the child is developing normally. During this period an
important task of the caseworker is to heli adoptive parents clarify their
own thinking about what explanation of adoption they will give to the
child.3 All agencies insist that the child be told of his adoption. 3 Practice
varies widely, however, as to how much information about the child's back-
ground should be given to adoptive parents, and through them, to the
child himself." Some agencies tell the parents as little as possible, partic-
ularly material of a negative nature. Others believe that adoptive parents
should be told everything they wish to know except the names of the child's
natural parents."3 But all agree that the adoptive parents should at least
have full knowledge of the child's medical history, and of any pathological
condition in his family history which may be inheritable.
4
1
Throughout the probationary period the caseworker maintains contact
with the home and observes the success of the placement.42 If at the end
of a fair trial the child is not making a reasonably satisfactory adjustment,
serious constitutional question under the "equal protection' clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Cf. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P2d 17 (1948), 58 YAmE L. 1. 472
(1949) (California anti-miscegenation statute held unconstitutional as violative of "equal
protection" clause). Even those statutes which are merely suggestive raise the possibility
that an unconstitutional criterion is sought to be applied.
37. See Rautman, Adoptive Parents Need Help, Too, 33 ME.NTAL H,'cm. 424 (1949).
38. Eppich & Jenkins, Telling Adopted Children in STrtMs oF CHnx.nnm= 96 (feyer
ed. 1948).
39. Because of the confidential nature of ad]option records, over half the states have
provisions protecting such records from public inspection. Berkley & Colby, Problems in
Safeguarding Adoptions, 23 JouRxAL or PEDnlAmcs 344, 349 (1943). Access is usually
limited to "parties in interest" or "parties to the action." Ibid. The Children's Bureau
recommends that all adoption records, including those of state welfare departments and
of any other agencies participating in the adoption, be made available only on court order.
EssExTrsAs OF AwopON LAW AND Pxocvua 24 (Children's Bureau Publication No. 331,
1949). As to changes in birth records following adoption, see FEDFML. Sacumn' AGSNcy,
THE CONF-mINTuAL NATuRE OF BmRTH REcoRas 6-3 (1949) ; Colby, Progress in Adoption
Legislation, 16 Socr" Smvica Rsvmw 64, 72-3 (1942) ; Huffman, A First Protection for
the Child Born out of Wedlock, 11 CHn-D 34 (1946).
40. Lippman, supra note 14, at 273.
41. Clothier, Placing the Child for Adoption, 26 INi'-rL Hycm,,E 257, 271 (1942).
42. Jenkins, supra note 23, at 407.
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the placement is terminated. A doubtful placement miay require that the
probationary period be extended. If a reexamination of the child produces
favorable results and the placement is judged to be successful, the agency
gives its consent to the adoption.
THE REGULATORY PROBLEI
When a child is placed independently, the safeguards of agency practice
are lacking and the risks of adoption are increased many-fold. Since the
identities of natural and adoptive parents are seldom concealed from one
another, adoptive parents are frequently harassed by a mother who has
changed her mind and wants her child back. Or the child may be mentally
deficient. This danger is particularly acute in the case of independent
placements with non-relatives, often made when the child is less than a
month old, because feeblemindedness can rarely be detected under the age
of three months. Furthermore, no systematic effort is made to study the
home before placement or to select the home best suited to the particular
child. In short, the natural parents may be high-pressured into hasty and
ill-considered decisions to surrender their child, the adoptive parents may
enter the arrangement blindly, and throughout the placement process the
child himself is a helpless pawn.
43
In order to minimize these risks, regulatory legislation should extend to
all adoptions the careful procedures of the more competent authorized
agencies. The statutes should protect three sets of interests. They should
protect the child from separation from natural parents who might give him
a good home if sufficient help were available to them, and from adoption
by persons unfit to rear a child. They should guard the natural parents
from hurried decisions to give up their child, made under strain and duress.
Finally, they should protect the adoptive parents from assuming respon-
sibility for a child whose mental and physical condition is questionable,
and from interference by the natural parents after the child has been sat-
isfactorily established in his new home.
Existing laws are of two types: adoption statutes proper, which govern
43. The need for adequate safeguards in adoptiv placements was demonstrated in
a- study conducted in 1945 by Dr. Catherine S. Amatruda of the Yale Child Development
Clinic. Dr. Amatruda undertook to analyze the results of 100 independent placements and
100 agency placements. Her standards were modest. A child was regarded as a good
adoption risk unless it was mentally retarded or had serious personality defects, A family
was regarded as suitable unless the investigation disclosed a highly unstable marriage,
serious psychiatric difficulties, alcoholism, prostitution, wife beating, or drug addiction.
Of the hundred independent placements, only 46 were satisfactory; 26 were questionable
at best; and 28 were definitely undesirable. The hundred agency placements, on the other
hand, had brought about a satisfactory situation in 76 instances; a questionable situation
in 16; and an undesirable situation in only 8. YALE CHILD DEVELOPMWET CLimIc, Rv-
PORT OF CURRENT ADOPTION PRACTCES IN CONNECTICUI--INDEPENDENT AND AGENCY
PLACEMENT (mimeographed, 1949).. See also Colby, Protection of Children is Adoption
in 65 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SocALN WoRu 146, 155-6 ,(939).
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the court proceeding; and placement statutes, which regulate the placing
of children in homes in contemplation of adoption. In most states the
pattern of regulation under these statutes is seriously deficient.
ADOPTION STATUTES
Adoption was unknown to the common law and was not authorized by
statute in Great Britain until 1926. 44 The earliest adoption statutes in the
United States permitted adoption by means of a deed, without court proceed-
ings of any kind.45 A Massachusetts statute of 1851 11 was the first to re-
quire a formal judicial proceeding.4 7 Adoption by deed persisted in other
states for many years thereafter, but such provisions have gradually been
repealed, and today every state requires that adoption be by judicial pro-
ceeding. 4
Jurisdiction and Venue
Since most adoptions are of minor children, jurisdiction of adoption pro-
ceedings is best vested in a court accustomed to handling childrdn's cases.
But this is not what the law of some states provides. In Utah, for example,
although juvenile courts have had forty-five years' experience handling
children's cases, adoption remains in the hands of the district courts. 2
In New York, three sets of courts-county, surrogate's, and children's-
preside over adoptions 5 Children's courts have jurisdiction over an adop-
44. 2 A orr, THE CHILD AND THE STATE 164 (1938). The original British statute,
16 & 17 GED. 5, c. 29 (1926), was followed by the Adoption of Children (Regulation) Act,
1939, 2 & 3 GEo. 6, c. 27, providing for the registration of adoption societies. Because of
the war, the operation of the latter statute wras suspended until June, 1943. See New
Adoption Regidations in England, 17 SocLA, SERvicE REvIEw 369 (1943) ; Adoption Prob-
lents in Great Britain, 24 CHID WELFARE LEAGUE or Am mcA BULLETIN 10 (April 1945).
On the history of adoption generally, see 2 A3Borr, op. cit. stpra, at 164-22a; Bnos
& BRooKs, op. cit. supra note 16, at 93-110; GALLAGHER, THE ADoPTED CHILD 19-28
(1936) ; PEcK, ADropTio LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (Children's Bureau Publica-
tion No. 148, 1925) ; Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 CoL. L. REv. 332 (1922).
45. Oler, Construction of Private Instruments Where Adopted Children Are Con-
cerned: 1, 43 MICH. L. REv. 705 n.1 (1945).
46. Mass. Acts & Resolves 1851, c. 324.
47. Oler, .vpra note 45, at 705 n.1; Kuhlmann, Interstate Succession by and from the
Adopted Child, 28 WAsH. U. L. Q. 221, 222-3 (1943).
48. Texas was the last state to enact this requirement. Until 1931 a person could
legally adopt a child in that state by filing with the county clerk a written statement of
adoption and, if the natural parents were living, a written transfer of parental authority.
Tmc. REv. Civ. STAT. arts. 42,44 (1925). See Note, 18 TF.. L. REV. 523 (1940). Despite
a 1931 statute requiring that all adoptions be by judicial proceeding, T.x. ANN-. Crv. STAT.
art. 46a (Vernon, 1947), adoption by deed continued to be widespread for several years
thereafter. WooL0oaD, THE ADMINISTRATION OF ADOPIONS UNDER TEXAs LAws 1936,
p.20 (1938).
49. UTAH CODE ANN. § 14-4-7 (1943). The Utah juvenile courts were created in
1905. See UTAH Comp. LAws § 720x (1907).
50. N.Y. DoxsTzc RELATIONS LAW §§ 109, 110.
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tion proceeding only when the child is delinquent, neglected, or dependent,61
and as a result they handle a relatively small percentage of all New York
adoption cases.
52
About a third of the states limit venue in adoption actions to the county
or district in which the petitioners reside. 3 Many states permit the action
also to be brought where the child resides, especially when the petitioners
are non-residents. 4 Some states further provide that when the child is in
the custody of a child-welfare agency, the proceeding may be brought where
the agency is located. 55 These multiple-venue provisions seem unwise. A
court must pass judgment on the qualifications of petitioners as prospective
parents, and, in some states, must supervise their home during a probationary
period.5 6 It thus would appear desirable to limit the action to the place
where they are known and where their home is located. Only in exceptional
cases should they be permitted to bring the action outside the county or
district in which they reside, and in no event outside the state of their
residence.'
Consent
Every state requires that the consent of certain parties be obtained before
an adoption may be approved by the court. s The consent of the child is gen-
erally mandatory if he is above a specified age, usually twelve or fourteen.5
Most states provide that if the petitioning adult is married, which is the
51. INFORMAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK 252 (1944).
52. Of a total of 1,079 adoptions granted in twelve upstate New York counties in 1946,
45 percent were granted by surrogate's courts, 44 percent by county courts, and 11 per-
cent by children's courts. STATE OF NEw YORK, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTE ON
SOCIAL WELFARE AND RELIEF OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMI=rEL ON INTERSTArE
'CooPERATION (Assemblyman Harold C. Ostertag, chairman) 29 (Legislative Document
No. 51, 1948) (hereafter cited as OSTERTAG REPORT).
53. LEAVy, THE LAW OF ADOPTION SrMPLIFIED 30-3 (1948). See, e.g., CAL. Civ.
CODE § 226 (Deering, 1949) ; MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 61-132 (Choate & Wertz, 1947).
54. Leavy, op. cit. supra note 53, at 30-3. See, e.g., CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 4, § 1
(1935) ; MAss. ANN. LAws c. 210, § 1 (Supp. 1948).
55. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.08 (Supp. 1948); Mn. ANN. Coaa art. 16, § 85B
(Flack, Supp. 1947).
56. See pages 730-1 infra.
57. If all states were to limit venue in this manner, one problem might arise: a dis-
proportionately large number of adoptable children in big cities and a corresponding
shortage of adoptable children in other areas where the need might be greater. This
could be remedied by authorized agencies in metropolitan centers transferring some of
their adoptable children to agencies located elsewhere, with the receiving agency reiniburs-
ing the transferring agency for expenses already incurred.
58. LEAvy, op. cit. supra note 53, at 40.
59. Id. at 40-2. A few states set the age at ten years. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 16,
§ 85G (Flack, Supp. 1947) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(543) (Supp. 1949). Louisiana
and South Carolina are the only states which do not require the consent of the child under
any circumstances.
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usual case, his spouse must either consent to the adoption or join in the
petition. 0
Under ordinary circumstances a child may not be adopted without the
consent of his natural parents, or, if he is illegitimate, without the consent
of his mother.6' But every state prescribes certain conditions under which
parental consent is not required. Typically consent may be omitted when
the parents (a) have abandoned, deserted, or neglected the child; (b) have
been deprived of the child's custody by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(c) have voluntarily surrendered the child to an authorized child-welfare
agency; (d) are habitual drunkards; (e) cannot be found or are unknown;
and (f) have been deprived of civil rights or imprisoned for a felony.6 ' In
many instances, however, there has been no prior judicial determination of
whether the parents are guilty of misconduct. As a result, the judge in the
adoption proceeding is faced with two questions: whether the natural parents
have so conducted themselves that they should be deprived of a child's
custody, either temporarily or permanently; and whether the child should
be adopted by the petitioners. These questions are quite distinct; the un-
fitness of the natural parents does not establish the fitness of the petitioners.
Yet if the two issues are part of the same proceeding, it is difficult to keep
them separate. 63 A satisfactory solution is found in the Wisconsin adoption
statute, under which the termination of parental rights is decided in a sep-
arate proceeding and becomes no part of the adoption action.
4
Where the consent of the parents is not necessary, somebody else must
usually give consent in their stead-the child's legal guardian or next of
kin, a "next friend" appointed by the court, or an authorized agency to
whom the child has been surrendered. 65 Little may be gained by permitting
60. 4 VEsuIEa, AmmAc FAmLY LAWS 340 (1936). See, e.g., IDAHO CoDE Aim.
§ 16-1503 (1948) (consent of spouse required); M:Ass. ANN. LAws c. 210, § I (Supp.
1948) (spouse must join in petition). Several of the states requiring joinder make an
exception for stepparent adoptions. E.g., TEx. ANN. Civ. STAT. art. 46a, § 1 (Vernon,
1947) ; Wisc. STAT. § 322.01 (1947).
61. LEavy, op. cit. supra note 53, at 42.
62. 4 VEaxrnE, op. cit. supra note 60, at 341. As to the consent required when the
natural parents are divorced, see Colby, Protection of Ciildren in Adoption, 65 Prnocn-
INGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL ,Vorx 146, 152 (1939) ; Note, 91 A.L.R.
1387 (1934).
63. See Note, 14 U. oF CHn L. REv. 303, 307 n16 (1947) ; Colby, Protection of Chli-
dren, in Adoption, 65 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CoNmnFMcs OF SocIAL Woan 146,
152-3 (1939).
64. Wis. STAT. §§ 322.04(2), 48.07(7)a (1947). Following the termination of par-
ental rights the court may, if it chooses, transfer the "care, control and custody" of the
child to an authorized agency, which then has authority to consent to the child's adoption.
Ibid.
65. The Maine statute is typical in this regard. It provides: "If there are no such
parents, or if the parents have abandoned the child and ceased to provide for its support,
consent may be given by the legal guardian; if no such guardian, then by the next of kin
in the state; if no such kin, then by some person appointed by the judge to act in the pro-
ceedings as the next friend of such child... In [cases of surrender to an authorized
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a "next friend" to give consent. A Children's Bureau study in 1936 re-
vealed that courts often regarded such appointments as a mere formality.
One Rhode Island judge, for example, said that he usually appointed "some-
one in the room," who merely signed the petition and made no investigation.
In Wisconsin the courts usually appointed an attorney, who received a
five-dollar fee from the county for his services.6 The Alabama-type statute
offers a much better solution. It provides that whenever the consent of the
parents is unnecessary and the child has no guardian, responsibility for
giving consent rests with the state welfare department.67
The statutes of many states are inadequate in other respects. A number
of them make no provision whereby parents may voluntarily surrender all
rights in achild to an authorized agency.8 And some states, though per-
mitting surrender, make no provision for dispensing with the consent of the
parents in a later adoption proceeding. 9
There is great diversity among the states as to the form which consent
may take. The Utah statute has the most stringent requirement, that all
consents must be signed before the court in which the petition is filed.7"
Other states require that consents be signed before any judge of a court of
record, except when the child is legally the ward of an authorized agency. 1
In a far greater number of states, however, the sole requirement is that
consents be acknowledged before a notary public or other officer authorized
to take acknowledgments.72 And some states are even more lax: they re-
quire simply that consents be "in writing," 73 or fail to specify any form in
which they are to be given.74 This laxity may be harmless when an author-
ized agency is participating in the case. It is dangerous in other circum-
stances. Natural parents, and particularly unwed mothers, are often pre-
agency or to the state welfare department] the consent to adoption hereinbefore provided
for may be given by such incorporated society, asylum, or home, or state department of
health and welfare, and the consent of the parents or parent of said child shall not be
required." Maine Laws 1945, c. 60.
66. COLBY, PROBLEMS AND PRoCIDURES IN ADOPTION 94-5 (Children's Bureau Pub-
lication No. 262, 1941). Such practices still persist in some states today. ESSENTIALS
OF ADOPTION LAW AND PROCEDURE 15 (Children's Bureau Publication No. 331, 1949).
67. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 2 (1940). North Dakota has a similar provision. N.D.
REv. CODE § 14-1104 (1943).
68. E.g., Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas.
69. E.g., I. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 373, § 2 and c. 420, § 3 (1938).
70. UTAH CODE ANN. § 14-4-8 (1943).
71. E.g., MicH. ANN. STAT. § 27.3178 (543) (Supp. 1947) (must be signed before
a probate or juvenile court judge) ; Wis. STAT. J 322.04(4) (1947) (must be signed before
a judge of the county in Which the parent resides or the child was born) ; N.D. Laws
1949, c. 130, § 1 (same).
72. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.14 (Supp. 1948); Maine Laws 1949, e. 173; NED,
REv. STAT. § 43-106 (1943) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 63-351 (1950).
73. E.g., ARIz. CODE ANN. § 27-203 (1939) ; N.H. Ray. LAWS c. 345, § 2 (1942)
ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 63.402 (1940).
* 74. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 3 (1940); D.C. CODE § 16-202 (1940); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 259.03 (1947).
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vailed upon to release their children for adoption before they have fully
considered the matter, sometimes even before the child is born. To pre-
vent undue influence or precipitate action, an adoption statute should re-
quire that all consents be signed in the presence of a judge or a representa-
tive of the state welfare department.
75
Invesligation and Trial Period
In recent years, a highly significant development in the law of adoption
is the requirement of a "social investigation" before the court may act upon
the petition. The investigation includes an inquiry into the reasons why the
natural parents are surrendering their child, into the child's family history,
environment, and physical and mental condition, and into the suitability
of the prospective adoptive parents to rear the child. In short, it is a codifica-
tion of the practice of authorized adoption agencies. Today thirty-five
states and the District of Columbia make a social investigation mandatory,
while six other states provide that it may be made in the discretion of the
court.7 Approximately two-thirds of these states vest responsibility for
making or arranging for the investigation in the state welfare department,
or require that it be made by an authorized public or private child-welfare
agency37 In the remaining states the court may designate a probation
officer or other officer of the court, an agency, or "any suitable person" to
make the investigationY8
The majority practice is clearly superior. Judges have neither the time
nor the training to make the investigation themselves. When the matter
75. California requires that consents be signed in the presence of a representative of
the state welfare department or of a licensed county adoption agency. This requirement
is waived, however, when the adoption is being made by a stepparent or has been ar-
ranged through an authorized agency. CAr. CIVIL CoDE § 226 (Deering, 1949).
Courts divide as to whether a natural parent who has given his consent may revoke
it before a final decree of adoption has been entered. See Notes, 32 Mn..,z. L Rmv. 496
(1948); 26 N.C.L. Rav. 293, 294-5 (1948); 138 A.L.R. 103S (1942); 156 A.L.R. 1011
(1945).
76. Colorado, Idaho, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wyoming are the
only states which make no provision for a social investigation of any sort. Maine, Mary-
land, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, and Pennsylvania provide that it may be made in the
court's discretion. See, e.g., Morr. REv. CODE § 61-133 (1947) ; N D. REv. STAT. § 43-107
(1943) ; P&. STAT. Axx. tit. 1, § 3 (Purdon, Supp. 1948). Oregon leaves the making
of an investigation to the discretion of the state welfare department. Omn. CoUP. LAws
ANN. § 63-401 (Supp. 1947). Under this provision the welfare department investigates
every adoption petition filed in the state except when the placement has been made by
an authorized agency. Communication to the YAmL LAW JOURMAL from Miss Loa How-
-ard, Administrator, Oregon Public Welfare Commission, dated Jan. 18, 1950, in Yale
Law Library. All other states and the District of Columbia make a social investigation
mandatory.
77. E.g., Dr.. REv. COD § 3550 (1935) ; N.M. STAT. AiN. § 25-202 (Supp. 1949);
VT. STAT. § 9942 (1947).
78. E.g., In.. Ax. STAT. c. 4, §3-1 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1949) ; S.D. Cori- § 14.0406
(1939) ; WAsn. R v. STAT. AxN. § 1699-10 (Remington, Supp. 1947).
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is left entirely in their hands, adoption petitions are often filed and granted
in a single day.79 It is not enough to require that the investigation be made
by somebody other than the judge; reports submitted by attorneys and
other persons appointed by the court tend to be inadequate. 0 The most
satisfactory requirement is that all adoption petitions be investigated by
caseworkers from the state welfare department or from an agency it desig-
nates.
Most states require that once the investigator has submitted his report
and recommendation to the court, the court hold a hearing before acting
upon the petition.8 ' It is a serious deficiency in many adoption statutes that
they make no provision for disposition of the child if the petition is denied.82
As a-result, judges often grant an adoption or allow the child to remain in the
adoptive home even though they find the placement undesirable." An
adoption statute should provide specifically that if the petition is denied
and the child is not already in the permanent custody of an authorized
agency, the judge should certify the case to the court having jurisdiction
to determine the custody of children.
8 4
About a fourth of the states provide that if the court approves of the
adoption, it shall issue an interlocutory rather than a final decree."5 There
is then a trial period, usually of six months or a year, during which the child
79. A study of 206 adoptions in four Indiana counties in 1939, for example, disclosed
that in 150 cases the petition had been granted on the same day it was filed. 7 INlDIANA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, QUARTERLY STATISTICAL SURVEY 12 (April-June,
1941). The Indiana adoption statute was amended in 1941 to require a social investiga-
tion by an authorized agency. IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-118 (Burns, 1946).
80. "When studies are made by social agencies either public or private, complete
investigations are made. When made by an attorney or other persons of the Judge's
choice, they tend to be meager and incomplete." Communication to the YALE LAW JOUR-
NAL from Miss Clara Willman, Supervisor, Children's Services, Washington Department
of Social Security, dated Nov. 14, 1949, in Yale Law Library.
81. 4 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 60, at 296.
82. E.g., Kansas, Montana, Utah.
83. OSTERTAG REPORT, supra note 52, at 25-6.
84. For statutory provisions of this type, see, e.g., OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 10512-21
(Page, Supp. 1949) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.28 (Supp. 1948).
Nineteen states expressly provide for appeal of adoption decrees. Zacharias, Judicial
Review of Adoption Decrees, 23 CHI-KE T. REv. 233, 237 (1945). For an analysis of
the statutes'and decisions on this point, see id. at 236-45.
85. LEAVY, op. cit. supra note 53, at 54-6. Several other states make the issuance of
an interlocutory decree discretionary with the trial court. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6867
(1949) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 85J (Flack, Supp. 1947). Furthermore, nearly half
the states, although having no provision for an interlocutory decree, require that the
child must have lived in the adoptive home for a specified period (usually six months
or a year) before the court may approve the adoption petition. LEAVY, op. cit. Supra
note 53, at 54-6. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-109(1) (1943) (six months); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 14-4-14 (1943) (one year). In these states, however, there is usually no
supervision of the home during this period, unless the placement has been made by an
authorized agency.
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lives in the adoptive home.8 6 The person or agency which made the original
social investigation visits the child at periodic intervals, and at the end of the
period reports its finding to the court. If the court is satisfied that the
adoption is in the best interests of the child it issues a final decree. Most
of these states give the court discretion to waive the trial period if it sees
fit, especially when the placement has been made by an authorized agency.s7
PLACEMENT STATUTES
Placement statutes, which regulate the placing of children in homes in
contemplation of adoption, are an adjunct of adoption statutes. An adoption
statute, though it embodies all the modem safeguards, including a Eocial
investigation as a part of the adoption proceeding, has one main defect:
the investigation frequently comes at too late a point. When a child is
placed independently the investigation is made only after an adoption
petition has been filed, often not until the child has lived in the home for a
year or more. 8 In the meantime, emotional ties have been formed between
the child and his new parents-the child has become a part of the adoptive
family. Courts are reluctant to break those ties by denying the adoption
petition, even though an investigation at this late point may disclose that
the placement is unsatisfactory. Judges realize that a child uprooted from
one home and transferred to another is subject to considerable trauma.
Hence they often think it wiser to approve an unsatisfactory placement ra-
ther than to remove a child from the surroundings with which he has become
familiar.n In this circumstance the investigatory process has failed to
accomplish its purpose.
86. E.g., Anm STAT. ANN. § 56-108 (1947) (six months); FA. STAT. A.;x. § 72.19
(Supp. 1948) (not more than one year as fixed by court); MIfcH. STAT. Am;.
§§27.3178(546)-(547) (Supp. 1949) (oneyear).
87. E.g., Omo Gmx. CODE AxN. § 10512-18 (Page, Supp. 1949) ; VA. CoDM Am, .
§ 63-355 (1950).
Courts generally hold that an adoption decree may be annulled on the same grounds as
any other decree. See Note, 2 A.L.R.2d 887 (1948). But over a third of the states make
special statutory provision for annulment of adoptions. The most common formula is
that the adoptive parents may seek annulment if the child develops feeblemindedness, in-
sanity, epilepsy, or venereal disease from causes existing at the time of the adoption and
not then known to the adopting parents. Bnooxs & Bnooxs, op. cit. supra note 16,
at 132. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 600.7 (1946) ; UTAH CoM ANN. § 14-4-13 (1943).
88. Many states provide that the child must have lived in the prospective adoptive
home for a period of six months or a year before the adoption may be approved by the
court. See note 85 .mpra. And in many cases an adoption petition is not filed until the
child has lived in the home for a period exceeding the statutory minimum. Lukas,
Babies Are Neither Vendible Nor Expendable, 5 N.Y. Crry BAR Ass'n REco-o 104
(1950); Townsend, Placement and Protective Serzices in Adoption, 75 PRocEMsrrns O'
THE NATiONAL Co ,FmxcE OF SoCIAL mVoRx 331, 334 (1949).
89. OSTRTAG REPoRT, supra note 52, at 25; Colby, Protection of Children in Adoption,
65 PROCEEDINGs OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SocIAL WoRn 146, 154 (1939);
Seeley, Adoptions: Maryland's Better Way, 37 Suvmm- Ga",ic 255, 258 (1948).
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Legislatures have sought to plug this hole by enacting three types of place-
ment statutes: those outlawing independent placements, in whole or in
part; those requiring judicial or administrative approval before an independ-
ent placement may be made; and those authorizing administrative inves-
tigation once a child has been placed independently. The results are not
encouraging.
The statutes of eleven jurisdictions provide that no person except a
natural parent, a guardian, a relative, or an authorized agency may place
a child in a home in contemplation of adoption." These statutes have proved
almost completely ineffective. The exception made for natural parents
opens the door to all types of independent placements. Evasion of the stat-
ute is simple; a third party who arranges a placement can easily make it
appear that the placement was made directly by the natural mother. 1
90. Alabama, California, District of Columbia, Montana, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., CAL Civ. CoDE § 224q
(Deering, 1949) (parents and authorized agencies); N.Y. SOCIAL WUP.FARE LAW § 374(2)
(parents, guardians, second degree relatives, and authorized agencies) ; D.C. Comn § 32-785
(Supp. 1949) (parents, guardians, third degree relatives, and authorized agencies).
91. The reluctance of law-enforcement officials to prosecute under a statute of this
type is well illustrated by a recent opinion of the attorney-general of Wisconsin, The
Wisconsin statutes provide that "no person, other than the parent or legal guardian, and
no firm, association or corporation, and no private institution shall place, assist, or or-
range for the placement of any child in the control and care of any person, with or with-
out contract or agreement, or place such child for adoption, other than a licensed child
welfare agency"; and that "no person conducting or in any way connected with the conduct
of any maternity hospital shall in any way directly or indirectly offer to dispose of any
child or hold himself out as being able to dispose of children in any manner." Wis.
STAT. §§48.37(1), 48.45(1) (1947) (emphasis added). In an opinion addressed to the
director of the state welfare department, dated July 24, 1948, the attorney-general of Wis-
consin spoke as follows: "You have submitted a number of types of cases of irregular place-
ments and inquire in each case whether the facts show a violation of one or the other of the
above statutes.
"A. The physician who confined Miss A, an un-married mother, learned that she
had expressed a wish to place her child for adoption. He therefore informed Mr. and
Mrs. Y, who were patients of his, that he knew of a child that would be available for
adoption. He gave the name of the adoptive parents to the mother. They made arrange-
ments to transfer the child to them upon discharge from the hospital. The adoptive
,parents sent a relative to meet the mother outside the hospital and the relative trans-
ported the child alone to the prospective adoptive home.
"B. The physician who confined Miss B, an unmarried mother, learned that she had
expressed a desire to place her child for adoption. The physician told the mother that
he knew a desirable adoptive home. He communicated with the proposed adoptive family,
telling them about the child and suggesting that they employ an attorney. Subsequently,
the attorney visited the mother and obtained the mother's consent. Upon discharge from
the hospital the mother and child were met by the adoptive parents who took the child to
their home.
"In case A it is our opinion that on the narrow fact situation presented no successful
prosecution could be maintained. While it could be argued that one who gives information
gratuitously to the parties performs a material act of 'assistance,' it is our view that unless
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But the statutes of eight states are apparently much more rigid, and
prohibit all independent placements except when made with relatives.0
2
In two of these states-Utah and New Jersey-the attorney-general has
nullified the statute by ruling that it does not apply to natural parents. 2
The statutes of the other states, though purporting to require that all place-
ments with non-relatives be made through authorized agencies, have been
notably unsuccessful. In Indiana, for example, over half of all placements
are made independently; in Maine independent placements accounted for
91 percent of the total in 1948.9 4 Officials are loath to prosecute when au-
thorized agencies are already heavily overburdened.
A few states have sought to control independent placements by re-
quiring approval of the welfare department or a court order before a child
is placed in a home in contemplation of adoption. 5 Those statutes which
require a court order make io provision for an investigation before the
order is issued." But this is a minor problem compared with the extent to
which the statutes are disregarded entirely. The Ohio law, for example,
provides that no placement of a child under two years of age may be made
more could be shown it would be impossible to obtain a conviction. If the physician, in
addition to informing the prospective adoptive parents of the existence of the child, ac-
tively promoted the placement, there would be a clear violation. But just passing on the
information is insufficient in our judgment to warrant a prosecution. The doctor could
always say that nothing he did prevented the parties from using proper channels in ob-
taining the placement. Nor was the act of the relatives in taldng possession of the child
for the adoptive parents, after the arrangements had been made, sufficient in our judgment
to warrant prosecution.
"In case B it is also our view that the physician should not be prosecuted for merely
giving the information, particularly since he suggested employment of an attorney. The
attorney, according to the facts stated, merely performed a legal service in obtaining the
mother's consent and did not 'assist' in or 'arrange' for the placement in the sense meant
by the statute." 37 OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF Visco. sI 403, 405-7
(1948).
92. Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Iaine, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Utah.
See, e.g., Tenn. Acts 1949, c. 127, § 11 (no exceptions) ; GA. Axx. CODE § 99-201 (1937)
(second degree relatives) ; IowA CoDE § 238.25 (1946) (fourth degree relatives).
93. Communication to the YALE LAW JoURNAL from Mr. John F. Larson, Director,
Bureau of Services for Children, Utah Department of Public Welfare, dated Nov. 15,
1948, in Yale Law Library; Communication to Mr. Sanford Bates, Commissioner, New
Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies, from Mr. Walter D. Van Riper, Attor-
ney-General of New Jersey, dated Aug. 14, 1946, photostatic copy in Yale Law Library.
A recent New Jersey decision confirmed the attorney-general's ruling. In re Ifoffett, 5
N.J. Super. 82, 68 A.2d 479 (1949).
94. Communications to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Mr. E. M. Dill, Administrator,
Indiana Department of Public Welfare, dated Dec. 5, 1949, and from Miss Lena Parrott,
Director of Child Welfare, faine Department of Health and Welfare, dated Nov. 14,
1949, both in Yale Law Library.
95. E.g., MscHl. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(552) (Supp. 1949) (court order); Mo. Ray.
STAT. ANN. § 9616 (Supp. 1949) (court order); Neb. Laws 1949, c. 204, § 1 (court
order) ; Ouio GEN. CODE A.N. § 1352-13 (Page, 1946) (consent of welfare department
or court order for children under two years).
96. Except for Michigan.
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without written consent of the state welfare department or commitment by
a juvenile court. A study of adoption practices in sixty-one Ohio counties
in 1938 disclosed widespread violation of this provision by parents, doctors,
nurses, maternity homes, lawyers, authorized agencies, and even by juvenile
courts which did not have proper jurisdiction over some of the children whom
they had placedY Yet there have been few prosecutions for violation of the
statute.9
Four states require that whenever a child is placed independently for
adoptive purposes, either the person who places the child or the person who
receives the child must notify the state welfare department.9 The depart-
ment is given authority to investigate the case and, if it finds that the child
has been placed in an unsuitable home, to take the child into its custody.
But in three of these states the investigation is discretionary with the de-
partment, 00 and in the one state which makds an investigation mandatory,
the present case-load is over 200 investigations per caseworker. 101
Evidently, a state cannot rid itself of independent placements by out-
lawing them. The ultimate answer to the problem may be a requirement
that all placements be made through authorized agencies, which would be
given enough money and large enough staffs to handle the additional load.
At present, however, no state seems ready to put up the necessary funds.
Meanwhile, probably the most satisfactory check on independent place-
ments would be to pass and enforce a statute providing that every person who
receives a child into his home and intends to provide it with permanent
care must register with the state welfare department. The registrant should
be required to file a report setting forth facts about the child, the natural
parents, and the manner in which the child was obtained. An investigation
by the welfare department should be mandatory. The department, if it
regards the placement as unsuitable, should be authorized to apply for a
court order terminating it. There should be subsequent investigations until
the child is formally adopted or reaches the age of sixteen." 2
97. MuLL xNix, Omo ADoPTioN STUDY 28-30, 38-9, 42, 178 (mimeographed, 1941).
98. Id. at 144; Communication to the Y.ALJE LAW JOURNAL from Judge J. H. Lam-
neck, Director, Ohio Department of Public Welfare, dated Nov. 22, 1949, in Yale Law
Library.
99. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 16H (Flack, Supp. 1947) (receivers must notify
welfare department); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 119, § 14 (Supp. 1948) (placers and re-
ceivers); N.H. REv. LAWS C. 130, §§ 17-8 (1942) (receivers); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
c. 373, § 3 (1938) (placers). Kentucky provides that any person who places a child for
adoption without first notifying the welfare department and obtaining its consent is
guilty of contributing to the neglect of the child. Ky. Ray. STAT. § 405.370 (1948).
100. Massachusetts, Maryland, and New Hampshire.
101. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Mr. Lawrence C. Cole, Ad-
ministrator, Children's Division, Rhode Island Department of Social Welfare, dated
Nov. 22, 1949, in Yale Law Library.
102. Various civic organizations in New York, including the Society for the Preven-
tion of Crime and the New York City Committee on Adoptions, are seeking enactment in
that state of a bill with substantially these provisions. N. Y. State Assembly, Bill No.
2347, introduced by Assemblyman Rabin, Feb. 22, 1949. The bill failed of passage at the
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A registration scheme of this sort would involve substantial outlays. But
being less complete, it would cost much less than a program requiring that
all placements be made through authorized agencies. Since a child would
go directly from his former home to his adoptive home, an agency would not
have the expense of supporting him for a period of a few months to several
years. Investigation of the adoptive parents and of the child would be less
complete, and therefore less expensive, than if an agency had arranged the
placement. Adoptive parents rather than the agency could pay the doc-
tor's fee and hospital expenses of the natural mother.
In addition to passing registration statutes, states should promptly out-
law independent placements in which a third party makes a profit. The
New York legislature recently enacted such a statute, making it a misde-
meanor for the first offense and a felony for subsequent offenses to give or
receive compensation for placing out a child.10 3 The statute specifically
exempts payments to authorized agencies and payments by adoptive
parents to cover the "reasonable and actual" medical fees and hospital
expenses of the natural mother.
LONG-RUN REromr
Registration and anti-profiteering laws would be improvements but not
cures. The basic difficulty in the field of adoption is a shortage of applied
community resources. Additional facilities are required not only for the
placement of children in adoptive homes, but for the care of unmarried
mothers as well. Case work service, financial assistance, and medical and
confinement care are essential. 10 4 Yet at present community services for the
unmarried mother are inadequate in the extreme. Her problem is particu-
larly acute if she has left her home town; often her care cannot be financed
from public funds because of legal limitations on residence, and private
funds are not available because private agencies give preference to local
applicants. 1 5 As long as the community ignores her needs she will continue
to place her child through unauthorized sources or, far worse, resort to
abortion to keep from having the child at all. An adequate program of assist-
1949 session of the legislature, but renewed efforts are being made to secure its passage at
the current session.
103. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 487-a. The first information under this statute was returned
on Dec. 5, 1949, against Irwin Slater, a New York attorney. N.Y. Times, Dc. 6, 1949,
p. 38, col. 6.
104. See, generally, MoRLocx, A Commuxrm's RFssoNsmrr Fort CumD BoaN
OuT oF WEDLOCK (mimeographed, 1949); Moesocx & CAmnw. , MATE R Ty Hos
FoR U mARaED MoTnm S (Children's Bureau Publication No. 309, 1946) ; Brenner, lyhat
Facilities Are Essential to the Adequate Care of the Unmarried Mother?, 69 Prccnznmws
OF THE NATiONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCI. WORx 426 (1942) ; Brower, What Shall I Do
With My Baby?, 12 CH Uz 166 (1948).
105. INDIANA DEPART N T OF PtBinc WVELARE, SumatRa" RErORT or ADoPno
AND UNmARRIED MOTHER STUDY 7 (mimeographed, 1946) ; NEvw Yo= CiTY Cobr==
ON ADOPTiO S, ADoPTIoN IN NEmv YoRx Crry 11-12, 33-4 (1948) ; Osm=AG Rmronr, supra
note 52, at 55-7.
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ance would avert unsatisfactory adoptions, increase the supply of children
for deserving persons to adopt, and relieve the underworld abortionist of
most of his business.
Adoption agencies themselves are partially to blame for the fact that three
out of every four adoptions are independently arranged. Some agencies
have too rigid a notion of what constitutes an adoptable child.' At times
an overly cautious attitude leads them to pass up valuable placement op-
portunities. 0 7 A few agencies still disqualify adoptive applicants on a
superficial basis.0 8 But these practices are not typical. One of the most
encouraging signs at present is the extent to which agencies are moving
toward more flexible standards.
Generally, agencies have the will but they do not have the way. Most of
them are supported entirely by private funds; in only a few cities, such as
Chicago, Cincinnati, and New York, are part of their expenses paid by the
city government.0 9 In an effort to increase their facilities, agencies are
experimenting with the practice of charging fees to adoptive parents.'
But this will always be a limited source of private funds if adoptive ap-
plicants are to be chosen on the basis of their qualifications as parents and
not on the basis of their incomes. Hand in hand with an expansion of pri-
vate facilities there must be an expansion of public facilities as well. State
welfare departments, financed by state funds and federal Social Security
grants,"' make few direct placements and often lack the personnel to in-
vestigate independent placements.
The need for sound adoption practices is great and is steadily increasing.
It is time the states moved to meet it.
106. MuLLINNIX, op. cit. supra note 97, at 114, 185; OSTERTAO REPORT, Supra note 52,
at 58; Johnson, Why Babies Are Bootlegged, 77 SuRvEY 176 (1941).
107. Theis, Case Work in the Process of Adoption. 69 PRocxmnraS OF T E NATIONAL
CONFERMCE OF SOCIAl. WORK 405, 408-9 (1942).
108. See page 721 supra.
109. BROOKS & BRooKs, op. cit. supra note 16, at 113; NE-w YORK CITY CoMMIT=FI ON
ADoIlONS, op. cit. supra note 105, at 18; PoLiER, EVERYONE'S CHILDREN, NOBODY'S CHILD
216 (1941).
110. Some agencies charge a flat fee, often of $100 or $150. See Carlton, An Adop-
tLion Agency Looks at Fees, 23 CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AalaicA BULLETIN 4 (Feb.
1944) ; Foster, Fees for Adoption Service, 74 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFRENCr
OF SOCIAL WORK 344 (1948). A number of agencies, however, have a graduated scale
geared to the income of the adoptive family. The Spence-Chapin Adoption Service of
New York City, for example, charges adoptive parents a fee of $100 to $450, depending
,on their circumstances. SPENCE-CHAPIN ADoPTioN SEpvicE, 1948 ANNUAL REPORT
(1949). The Free Synagogue Child Adoptiori Committee of New York City recently es-
tablished a schedule ranging from a $200 fee for incomes below $3,500, to a $1200 fee for
incomes above $15,000. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, p. 37, col. 5.
. 111. The Social Security Act of 1935 authorized an annual appropriation of $1,510,000
to be alloted to the states for the development of child-welfare services. 49 STAT. 633
(1935), 42 U.S.C. § 721 (1946). In 1946 Congress increased the authorized annual ap-
propriation to $3,500,000. 60 STAT. 986 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 721 (1946). The allotment is
"made by the Federal Security Administrator on the basis of plans developed jointly by
him and state welfare departments. Ibid.
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